System and method for managing secure information within a hybrid portable computing device

ABSTRACT

A method and system for managing secure information within a portable computing device are disclosed. The portable computing device includes a program module for communicating with a secure element that is part of the portable computing device. The secure element may receive messages utilizing the decrypted crypto keys derived from a non-padded cipher in order to establish a secure communications channel. The secure element may store at least one of a substantial encryption key for server authentication and a substantial encryption key for decrypting encrypted data stored locally within the portable computing device. If an incorrect password is entered after a predetermined number of times, the secure element may activate security measures which may permanently disable the secure element. To establish secure communications between the secure element and a CPU of the portable computing device, a password based encryption algorithm utilizing a non-padded cipher may be employed.

DESCRIPTION OF THE RELATED ART

Portable computing devices (PCDs) are becoming necessities for people onpersonal and professional levels. These devices may include cellulartelephones, portable digital assistants (PDAs), portable game consoles,palmtop computers, and other portable electronic devices.

PCDs are often utilized to conduct financial transactions. For example,PCDs may be used to check bank account balances, transfer funds betweenbank accounts, and for paying bills. While this ability to conductfinancial transactions is a significant benefit for the user of a PCD,the current state of the art requires that a communication link beestablished between the PCD and a computer server to conduct financialtransactions because sensitive financial data is only stored at thecomputer server. Meanwhile, the PCD is not permitted to store anysensitive financial data locally (within the PCD) when the communicationlink between the computer server and PCD is not present.

With the PCD not permitted to store any such sensitive financial data, auser of such a PCD cannot access financial data or conduct any financialtransactions when the communication link between the computer server andPCD is not present. This is a significant problem because there aremultiple situations and geographic locations in which wirelesscommunication links between a PCD and a computer server are notpermitted or are very difficult to make.

For example, a business person who often travels by airplane willusually not be permitted to establish communication link between his orher PCD and a computer server while an airplane is in transit. Otherexemplary situations in which communication links between a PCD and acomputer server are often difficult to make include, but are not limitedto, remote geographic locations that do not provide for wirelesscommunications, i.e. the desert, the ocean, sparsely populated areas,etc.

While users of PCDs have requested local storage of sensitive financialdata on PCDs in an off-line mode, one of the main problems with localstorage of sensitive financial data is how to keep this informationsecure from unauthorized users of the PCDs.

Accordingly, what is needed is a system and method that may overcome theproblems associated with the local storage of sensitive data on a PCD.Another need exists in the art for providing a hybrid portable systemwith media rich content that enhances a user's experience which may alsotake advantage of enhanced security features provided by a secureelement application.

SUMMARY OF THE DISCLOSURE

A method and system for providing a hybrid mobile wallet are disclosed.The method and system overcomes problems that have been associated withconventional pure baseband software applications which typically do nothave secure storage and which usually cannot sufficiently protectcryptographic keys. Meanwhile, such conventional pure baseband softwareapplications typically have an excellent user interface, bulk storage,and network connectivity capabilities. On the other end of the spectrum,conventional pure secure element applications typically have really pooruser interfaces and have limited storage and network connectivity,however, conventional secure element applications usually only havesecure storage for a small amount of data. The method and systemprovides a mobile wallet that has an element running on a baseband andan element running on a secure element. These two elements work intandem thereby gaining the best of the two worlds described above: oneassociated with pure secure element applications and one associated withpure baseband software applications.

A method for managing secure information within a portable computingdevice is also disclosed. The method may include initializing a programmodule of a central processing unit for communicating with a secureelement that is part of the portable computing device and receiving apassword for gaining access to the secure element. The method may alsoinclude initializing a password based encryption algorithm with thepassword and establishing a secure communication channel between thesecure element and the central processing unit based on the passwordbased encryption algorithm. If the password is incorrect, then themethod may include determining if a predetermined threshold number ofpassword attempts has been achieved.

A computer system for managing secure information within a portablecomputing device is also described. The system may include a processoroperable to initialize a program module of a central processing unit forcommunicating with a secure element that is part of the portablecomputing device and operable to initialize a password based encryptionalgorithm with the password. The processor may also establish a securecommunication channel between the secure element and the centralprocessing unit based on the password based encryption algorithm if thepassword is correct. The processor may then determine if a predeterminedthreshold number of password attempts has been achieved if the passwordis incorrect.

A computer system for managing secure information within a portablecomputing device is described and may include means for initializing aprogram module of a central processing unit for communicating with asecure element that is part of the portable computing device. The systemmay also include means for receiving a password for gaining access tothe secure element and means for initializing a password basedencryption algorithm with the password. The system may further havemeans for establishing a secure communication channel between the secureelement and the central processing unit based on the password basedencryption algorithm. The system may also include means for determiningif a predetermined threshold number of password attempts has beenachieved if the password is incorrect.

A computer program product comprising a non-transitory computer usablemedium having a computer readable program code embodied therein isdisclosed. The computer readable program code may be adapted to beexecute and to implement a method for managing secure information withina portable computing device that includes initializing a program moduleof a central processing unit for communicating with a secure elementthat is part of the portable computing device. The method may alsoinclude receiving a password for gaining access to the secure elementand initializing a password based encryption algorithm with thepassword. The method may further include establishing a securecommunication channel between the secure element and the centralprocessing unit based on the password based encryption algorithm. If thepassword is incorrect, then the method may include determining if apredetermined threshold number of password attempts has been achieved.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

In the Figures, like reference numerals refer to like parts throughoutthe various views unless otherwise indicated. For reference numeralswith letter character designations such as “102A” or “102B”, the lettercharacter designations may differentiate two like parts or elementspresent in the same figure. Letter character designations for referencenumerals may be omitted when it is intended that a reference numeral toencompass all parts having the same reference numeral in all Figures.

FIG. 1A is a diagram of a wireless portable computing device coupled toa wireless communications network;

FIG. 1B is a front plan view of a first aspect of a portable computingdevice (PCD) in a closed position;

FIG. 1C is a front plan view of the first aspect of a PCD in an openposition;

FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a second aspect of a PCD;

FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a processing system for a secure elementcontained within the PCD;

FIG. 4 is a block diagram of an exemplary software architecture for thePCD;

FIG. 5 is a flowchart illustrating a method for managing secureinformation within a PCD; and

FIG. 6 is a flowchart illustrating a sub-method or a routine of FIG. 5for establishing secure communications between a baseband centralprocessing unit and a secure element of PCD.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The word “exemplary” is used herein to mean “serving as an example,instance, or illustration.” Any aspect described herein as “exemplary”is not necessarily to be construed as preferred or advantageous overother aspects.

In this description, the term “application” may also include fileshaving executable content, such as: object code, scripts, byte code,markup language files, and patches. In addition, an “application”referred to herein, may also include files that are not executable innature, such as documents that may need to be opened or other data filesthat need to be accessed.

The term “content” may also include files having executable content,such as: object code, scripts, byte code, markup language files, andpatches. In addition, “content” referred to herein, may also includefiles that are not executable in nature, such as documents that may needto be opened or other data files that need to be accessed.

As used in this description, the terms “component,” “database,”“module,” “system,” and the like are intended to refer to acomputer-related entity, either hardware, firmware, a combination ofhardware and software, software, or software in execution. For example,a component may be, but is not limited to being, a process running on aprocessor, a processor, an object, an executable, a thread of execution,a program, and/or a computer. By way of illustration, both anapplication running on a computing device and the computing device maybe a component. One or more components may reside within a processand/or thread of execution, and a component may be localized on onecomputer and/or distributed between two or more computers. In addition,these components may execute from various computer readable media havingvarious data structures stored thereon. The components may communicateby way of local and/or remote processes such as in accordance with asignal having one or more data packets (e.g., data from one componentinteracting with another component in a local system, distributedsystem, and/or across a network such as the Internet with other systemsby way of the signal).

In this description, the terms “communication device,” “wirelessdevice,” “wireless telephone,” “wireless communication device,” and“wireless handset” are used interchangeably. With the advent of thirdgeneration (“3G”) wireless technology, greater bandwidth availabilityhas enabled more portable computing devices with a greater variety ofwireless capabilities. Therefore, a portable computing device mayinclude a cellular telephone, a pager, a PDA, a smartphone, a navigationdevice, or a hand-held computer with a wireless connection or link.

Referring initially to FIG. 1A, this figure is a diagram of a wirelessportable computing device (PCD) 100 coupled to a wireless communicationsnetwork 206. Many of the system elements illustrated in FIG. 1A arecoupled via communications links 103A-C to the communications network206. The links 103 illustrated in FIG. 1A may comprise wired or wirelesslinks. Wireless links include, but are not limited to, radio-frequency(“RF”) links, infrared links, acoustic links, and other wirelessmediums. The communications network 206 may comprise a wide area network(“WAN”), a local area network (“LAN”), the Internet, a Public SwitchedTelephony Network (“PSTN”), a paging network, or a combination thereof.The communications network 206 may be established by broadcast RFtransceiver towers 208. However, one of ordinary skill in the artrecognizes that other types of communication devices besides broadcastRF transceiver towers 208 are included within the scope of the inventionfor establishing the communications network 206.

The server 210 may support and store financial transaction(s) data in astorage device 404A. The financial transaction(s) data may be downloadedand stored in another storage device, such as memory 404A, in thewireless PCD 100. The PCD 100 is shown to have an antenna 372 so that arespective PCD 100 may establish wireless communication links 103 withthe communications network 206.

The server 210 may communicate with the wireless PCD 100 across thecommunications network 206 in order to share its financial transactionsdata with the PCD 100 that are processed and managed by a secure element390 and a baseband CPU 402 of the PCD 100. The secure element 390 mayalso support communications with a reader 265 that is coupled to apoint-of-sale (POS) terminal. The secure element 390 of the PCD 100 maysupport various types of transactions, such as purchases, moneytransfers, etc. similar to those supported by conventional smart cards,as understood by one of ordinary skill the art.

Referring to FIG. 1B and FIG. 1C, an exemplary portable computing device(PCD) is shown and is generally designated 100. As shown, the PCD 100may include a housing 102. The housing 102 may include an upper housingportion 104 and a lower housing portion 106. FIG. 1A shows that theupper housing portion 104 may include a display 108. In a particularaspect, the display 108 may be a touch screen display. The upper housingportion 104 may also include a trackball input device 110. Further, asshown in FIG. 1A, the upper housing portion 104 may include a power onbutton 112 and a power off button 114. As shown in FIG. 1A, the upperhousing portion 104 of the PCD 100 may include a plurality of indicatorlights 116 and a speaker 118. Each indicator light 116 may be a lightemitting diode (LED).

In a particular aspect, as depicted in FIG. 1B, the upper housingportion 104 is movable relative to the lower housing portion 106.Specifically, the upper housing portion 104 may be slidable relative tothe lower housing portion 106. As shown in FIG. 1B, the lower housingportion 106 may include a multi-button keyboard 120. In a particularaspect, the multi-button keyboard 120 may be a standard QWERTY keyboard.The multi-button keyboard 120 may be revealed when the upper housingportion 104 is moved relative to the lower housing portion 106. FIG. 1Bfurther illustrates that the PCD 100 may include a reset button 122 onthe lower housing portion 106.

Referring to FIG. 2, an exemplary, non-limiting aspect of a portablecomputing device (PCD) is shown and is generally designated 100. Asshown, the PCD 100 includes an on-chip system 322 that includes amulticore CPU 402. The multicore CPU 402 may include a zeroth core 410,a first core 412, and an Nth core 414.

As illustrated in FIG. 2, a display controller 328 and a touch screencontroller 330 are coupled to the multicore CPU 402. In turn, a touchscreen display 108 external to the on-chip system 322 is coupled to thedisplay controller 328 and the touch screen controller 330.

FIG. 2 further shows that a video encoder 334, e.g., a phase alternatingline (PAL) encoder, a sequential color a memoire (SECANT) encoder, or anational television system(s) committee (NTSC) encoder, is coupled tothe multicore CPU 402. Further, a video amplifier 336 is coupled to thevideo encoder 334 and the touch screen display 108. Also, a video port338 is coupled to the video amplifier 336. As shown in FIG. 2, auniversal serial bus (USB) controller 340 is coupled to the multicoreCPU 402. Also, a USB port 342 is coupled to the USB controller 340.Memory 404B and a subscriber identity module (SIM) card 346 may also becoupled to the multicore CPU 402.

Further, as shown in FIG. 2, a digital camera 348 may be coupled to themulticore CPU 402. In an exemplary aspect, the digital camera 348 is acharge-coupled device (CCD) camera or a complementary metal-oxidesemiconductor (CMOS) camera.

As further illustrated in FIG. 2, a stereo audio coder-decoder (CODEC)350 may be coupled to the multicore CPU 402. Moreover, an audioamplifier 352 may coupled to the stereo audio CODEC 350. In an exemplaryaspect, a first stereo speaker 354 and a second stereo speaker 356 arecoupled to the audio amplifier 352. FIG. 2 shows that a microphoneamplifier 358 may be also coupled to the stereo audio CODEC 350.Additionally, a microphone 360 may be coupled to the microphoneamplifier 358. In a particular aspect, a frequency modulation (FM) radiotuner 362 may be coupled to the stereo audio CODEC 350. Also, an FMantenna 364 is coupled to the FM radio tuner 362. Further, stereoheadphones 366 may be coupled to the stereo audio CODEC 350.

FIG. 2 further illustrates that a radio frequency (RF) transceiver 368may be coupled to the multicore CPU 402. An RF switch 370 may be coupledto the RF transceiver 368 and an RF antenna 372. As shown in FIG. 2, akeypad 374 may be coupled to the multicore CPU 402. Also, a mono headsetwith a microphone 376 may be coupled to the multicore CPU 402. Further,a vibrator device 378 may be coupled to the multicore CPU 402. FIG. 2also shows that a power supply 380 may be coupled to the on-chip system322. In a particular aspect, the power supply 380 is a direct current(DC) power supply that provides power to the various components of thePCD 100 that require power. Further, in a particular aspect, the powersupply is a rechargeable DC battery or a DC power supply that is derivedfrom an alternating current (AC) to DC transformer that is connected toan AC power source.

FIG. 2 further indicates that the PCD 100 may also include a networkcard 388 that may be used to access a data network, e.g., a local areanetwork, a personal area network, or any other network. The network card388 may be a Bluetooth network card, a WiFi network card, a personalarea network (PAN) card, a personal area network ultra-low-powertechnology (PeANUT) network card, or any other network card well knownin the art. Further, the network card 388 may be incorporated into achip, i.e., the network card 388 may be a full solution in a chip, andmay not be a separate network card 388.

As depicted in FIG. 2, the touch screen display 108, the video port 338,the USB port 342, the camera 348, the first stereo speaker 354, thesecond stereo speaker 356, the microphone 360, the FM antenna 364, thestereo headphones 366, the RF switch 370, the RF antenna 372, the keypad374, the mono headset 376, the vibrator 378, and the power supply 380are external to the on-chip system 322.

FIG. 2 further illustrates a secure element 390 that is coupled to themulticore CPU 402A. The secure element 390 may comprise an integratedcircuit (IC) or chip that is typically found on/in smart cards orintegrated circuit (IC) cards. Further details of the secure element 390will be described below in connection with FIG. 3.

In a particular aspect, one or more of the method steps described hereinmay be stored in the memory 404A or the secure element 390 (or both) ascomputer program instructions. These instructions may be executed by themulticore CPU 402 or the secure element 390 (or both) in order toperform the methods described herein. Further, the multicore CPU 402,the memory 404, the secure element 390, or a combination thereof mayserve as a means for executing one or more of the method steps describedherein.

FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a processing system for a secure elementcontained 390 within the PCD 100. The secure element 390 may comprise anintegrated circuit (IC) or chip that is typically found on/in smartcards or integrated circuit (IC) cards. The secure element 390 maycomprise a contact based IC or a contactless based IC. As understood byone of ordinary skill in the art, a contact based IC typically requiresa physical connection, via electrical contacts, between the IC circuitand a reader/another IC. A contactless based IC utilizes wirelesscommunications such as near-field RF communications between the ICcircuit and a reader/another IC. According to one preferred andexemplary embodiment, the secure element 390 comprises a contactlessbased IC as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.

The secure element 390 may comprise an analog front end (AFE) thatincludes one or more contactless protocol module(s) 420 as understood byone of ordinary skill in the art. Exemplary contactless protocolssupported by the one or modules 420 include, but are not limited to,Standard European Computer Manufacturers Association (ECMA) 340, NearField Communication Interface and Protocol (NFCIP-1), ISO (theInternational Organization for Standardization) and IEC (theInternational Electrotechnical Commission) Standards 14443A, 14443B,15963, and 18000, and other like contactless protocols. With theseprotocols, the secure element 390 may support one or more modes ofoperation that include, but are not limited to, a card emulation mode, areader mode, and a peer-to-peer communication mode.

The analog front end (AFE) 420 comprising the contactless protocolmodules may be coupled to a system bus 417. The system bus 417 may haveseveral other components coupled to it: a memory 404B, a centralprocessing unit 402B, security measures for 416, a power managementmodule 418, a clock management module 422, sensors 424, timers 426, atrue random number generator (TRNG) 428, a hardware data encryptionstandard (DES) accelerator 430, an ISO/IEC Standard 3309 cyclicredundancy check (CRC) module 432, and an instruction address register(IAR) 434. Additional or fewer modules than those illustrated in FIG. 3may be employed without departing from the scope of the invention asunderstood by one of ordinary skill the art.

The Data Encryption Standard (DES) module 430 may perform thecalculation of DES and triple DES algorithms. The cyclical redundancycheck (CRC) module 432 verifies data integrity by checking the data tosee whether an error has occurred during transmission, reading, orwriting. CRC calculations are standardized in the protocol layer;ISO/IEC 7816 for contact smart cards, and ISO/IEC 14443 for contactlesssmart cards.

The high quality, true random number generator (TANG) 428 may be thebasis of many cryptographic protocols and is also used in conjunctionwith software to harden cryptography against Differential Power Analysis(DPA) and Simple Power Analysis (SPA). The TANG 428 can be used tocreate randomly different and false wait states that confuse theattacker when they are attempting to analyze the power consumption ofthe chip. High quality random numbers protect keys when appropriatelyused in mutual authentication and encryption. In these applications,random numbers are encrypted, exchanged and then eventually used as thebasis of session keys guarding transactions. True random numbers are notfeasibly guessed by attackers and therefore maximize the strength of thecryptography used.

The power management unit 418 may scramble current consumption byperforming dummy access operations in memory. As a result of scrambling,the current consumption of the actual program flow is hidden. When usedin conjunction with the TRNG 428 and random wait states, this feature isa powerful countermeasure against power analysis of the secure element390.

The OS 435A may be embedded in the secure element's non-volatile memory(such as ROM) 436A during the manufacturing process. The OS 435A may notonly define program operations for IC applications, it may also includesoftware security features to counter software attacks and enhance thesecurity features noted above.

The memory 404B of the secure element 390 may comprise a volatilecomponent as well as a non-volatile component. The non-volatilecomponent may comprise read only memory (ROM) 436A. The ROM 436A maystore the operating system (OS) for the secure element 390 which may beexecuted by the central processing unit 402B and/or firmware asunderstood by one of ordinary skill in the art.

The volatile component for the memory 404B of the secure element 390 maycomprise random access memory (RAM) 436B. The volatile memory componentfor the secure element may incorporate other different memorytechnologies, such as, but not limited to, erasable programmableread-only memory (EPROM) or electrically erasable programmable read-onlymemory (EEPROM), and/or flash memory and ferroelectric random accessmemory (FRAM).

The RAM 436B may also comprise an operating system for 435B as well asone or more application programs, such as, a first substantialencryption key 446A for server authentication, a secure channel managermodule 442, and a second substantial encryption key 446B for decryptingsecure data on the PCD 100.

The first substantial encryption key 446A used for authenticating thePCD 100 to a server 210 may comprise a symmetric key or an asymmetrickey. A key, as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, is apiece of information (a parameter) that determines the functional outputof a cryptographic algorithm or cipher. Without a key, a cryptographicalgorithm would typically have no result. In encryption, a key specifiesthe particular transformation of plaintext into ciphertext, or viceversa during decryption as understood by one of ordinary skill in theart. If the substantial encryption key 446A comprises an asymmetric key,then its minimum size may comprise 1024 Bits. However, asymmetric keysof greater sizes are within the scope of the invention. Greater sizesfor symmetric keys include, but are not limited to, 2048 Bits, and 3072Bits, and greater.

Any one of a number of cryptography algorithms may be employed with thesecure element 390 without departing from the invention. The secureelement 390 may employ a public-key encryption algorithm: such analgorithm does not require a secure initial exchange of one or moresecret keys to both sender and receiver. Public-key algorithms areasymmetric key algorithms as understood by one of ordinary skill in theart.

One exemplary public-key cryptography algorithm which may be employed bythe secure element 390 and uses asymmetric keys is RSA (Rivest, Shamirand Adleman). Another exemplary public-key cryptography algorithm isElliptic curve cryptography (ECC). Another exemplary algorithm which maybe employed is the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) as understood byone of ordinary skill in the art.

Asymmetric key algorithms, as understood by one of ordinary skill in theart, are used to create a mathematically related key pair: a secretprivate key and a published public key. Use of these keys allowsprotection of the authenticity of a message by creating a digitalsignature of a message using the private key, which may be verifiedusing the public key. It also allows protection of the confidentialityand integrity of a message, by public key encryption, encrypting themessage using the public key, which may only be decrypted using theprivate key.

However, the secure element 390 may also employ symmetric-keyalgorithms. Symmetric-key algorithms are a class of algorithms forcryptography that use trivially related, often identical, cryptographickeys for both decryption and encryption. Exemplary sizes for substantialencryption keys 446A for symmetric-key algorithms used forauthenticating the PCD 100 to a server 210 include, but are not limitedto, sizes of 80 bits, 112 bits, 128 bits, 256 bits, and greater.Exemplary symmetric-key algorithms include, but are not limited to, theData Encryption Standard (DES), Triple DES, and the Advanced EncryptionStandard (AES).

The first substantial encryption key 446A for server authentication maybe the same key or a different key relative to the second substantialencryption key 446B for decrypting local data stored on the PCD 100. Ifthe keys 446A, 446B are different, then their respective sizes and typesmay be also different. For example, the first encryption key 446A forserver authentication may comprise an asymmetric key while the secondencryption key 446B for decrypting local data stored on the PCD 100 maycomprise a symmetric key, and vice-versa. Alternatively, the substantialencryption keys 446A, 446B could be of the same type but may havedifferent respective sizes. Various combinations of different or similarkeys 446A, 446B are within the scope of the invention and understood byone of ordinary skill in the art.

The secure channel manager module 442 may comprise an applicationprogram or module which receives and manages encrypted secure channelkeys that are sent by the SE communication application program 450 ofthe base band processor 402A.

To access the encrypted secure channel keys, a personal identificationnumber (PIN) in combination with a password based encryption (PBE)algorithm may be managed by the PBE Algorithm application 444 that isexecuted by the baseband processor 402A. An exemplary short PIN-lengthas of this writing may comprise four characters. However, other lengthsfor the PIN are within the scope of the invention. The secure element390 is able to support relatively short PIN lengths because of thesecurity measures 416 which are present within the secure element 390.Such security measures may be employed by the secure element 390, andspecifically the secure channel manager 442, only after a fewunsuccessful attempts to establish a secure communication channelbetween the SE Communication application 450 and the Secure ChannelManager 442. An unsuccessful attempt would include an instance when thewrong PIN is entered and does not unlock the encrypted secure channelkeys contained within or accessible by the PBE algorithm 444. Thesecurity measures 416 employed by the secure channel manager 442 maycomprise permanent disablement of at least one of memory and theoperating system of the secure element 390 as understood by one ofordinary skill in the art.

Additional security measures for the secure element 390 executed by thesecure channel manager 442 may include external clock frequency andvoltage monitoring. Memory access rights of the secure element 390 maybe controlled by the memory management and protection unit that is partof the security measure(s) block 416. An active shield layer of thesecure element 390 may detect attempts to probe or force internalcomponents or signal lines. Specifically, the secure element 390 maycomprise a programmable active shield which covers the entire secureelement 390 and is equipped with signal layers that detect attempts toprobe or force internal modules or signal lines. Random generation ofcurrent noise on idle buses (bus confusion) may be generated to protectagainst attackers who analyze the bus 417. When someone tries to analyzethe secure element 390 with various techniques, several built-in sensorsmay be activated and trigger a special security reset, which immediatelyoverwrites the RAM area. A functional current scrambling engine, inconjunction with the true random number generator 428 and random waitstate feature, may protect against power and timing analyses of thesecure element 390.

Other security measures for the secure element 390 may include, but arenot limited to, random wait state insertion; bus confusion and memoryencryption; continuous check of random characteristics; currentscrambling/stabilizing; voltage regulation; dual bus rails, where thetransmission of data is passed from one rail of the bus to the other toconfuse the attacker; use of a memory management unit to prohibit oneapplication from accessing the code of another application; activeshielding that renders the IC inactive when triggered; small IC geometry(approximately less than or equal to 0.22 micro-meter as a maximumfeature size) to deter microprobing; continuous checking of the randomcharacteristics of the IC; unique timing and a unique IC physicallayout.

Some sensors that may be built into the secure element 390 to thwartfault or invasive attacks may include, but are not limited to, thefollowing: low and high frequency sensors for the internal clock;sensors and filters for the external clock; external high and lowvoltage sensors; internal voltage sensors; temperature sensors; peakvoltage sensors; glitch sensors on internal voltage; and light sensorson the IC surface.

The security measures 416 may be activated when a threshold number ofunsuccessful secure channel initiations have been made or when an attackis sensed by one of the sensors noted above. The threshold number ofunsuccessful secure channel initiations is usually set at a low numberin order to make the secure element 390 safe against attacks andunauthorized uses of the PCD 100. For example, exemplary thresholds maycomprise an order of three, four, five, or six attempts which may bepermitted to enter a valid PIN that is used as a key to a password basedencryption (PBE) algorithm. The PBE algorithm is used to decryptcryptographic keys needed to establish a secure communication channeland managed by the secure channel manager module 442. After theexemplary threshold of attempts has been exceeded, any one of thesecurity measures 416 may be activated.

According to one exemplary embodiment, when the security measures 416are activated, they are typically permanent in nature. This means thatthe secure element 390 is permanently deactivated and unable to processany further data. This also means that there is usually no way to resetthe secure element 390. Because of this permanent deactivation of thesecure element 390, another PCD 100 may need to be obtained, and in manycases, purchased by the consumer/user.

A PBE which has a non-padded cipher is used to establish the securecommunication channel 448 of FIG. 4, discussed below. Specifically, thePBE using the nonpadded cipher is just used to encrypt/decrypt thesecure channel keys that will then be used to establish the securecommunication channel 448. As understood to one of ordinary skill in theart, block cipher algorithms like the Data Encryption Standard (DES) andBlowfish in Electronic Code Book (ECB) and Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)mode require their input to be an exact multiple of the block size. Ifthe plain text to be encrypted is not an exact multiple, padding may berequired before encrypting by adding a padding string. When decrypting,the receiving party usually needs to know how to remove the padding inan unambiguous manner. To increase security for establishing the securecommunication channel 448 between the secure element 390 and thebaseband CPU 402A, a password based encryption (PBE) encryptionalgorithm or cipher which does not utilize any padding is employed.

As noted previously, the secure element 390 in addition to providingenhanced security for locally stored encrypted data within the PCD 100may also have its normal contactless smart card functionality. In otherwords, the secure element 390 may also support financial transactionssuch as being used for exchanging money or funds for purchases when thePCD 100 is presented to a reader 265 coupled to a point of sale terminal267, as illustrated in FIG. 1C. The secure element 390 may comprise acontact interface and a contactless interface. Such a secure element 390may support both ISO/IEC 7816 and ISO/IEC 14443 protocols to communicatewith the reader 265.

FIG. 4 is a block diagram of an exemplary software architecture 400 forthe PCD 100. As illustrated in the software architecture 400 of FIG. 4,the baseband CPU 402A of the PCD 100 is establishing a securecommunications channel 448 with the secure element 390. As notedpreviously in FIG. 3, the secure element 390 may comprise variousprogram modules that include, but are not limited to, security measures416A, a substantial encryption key 446A for server authentication, thesecure channel manager module 442, and a substantial encryption key 446Bfor decrypting data in the PCD 100.

The security measures module 416A may activate one or more actualsecurity measures 416B if a predetermined number of attempts forentering the PIN or password has been exceeded as described above inconnection with FIG. 3. These security measures 416B have beenillustrated with “X”-shaped element to indicate that the measures 416Bmay cut off or eliminate the communication channel 448 between thesecure element 390 and baseband CPU 402A of the PCD 100 if the wrong PINor password has been entered above the predetermined, permitted amounts.

The baseband CPU 402A of the PCD 100 may execute or run one or moreprogram modules that may include, but are not limited to, a passwordbased encryption (PBE) module 444, a secure element communicationapplication or module 450, and a financial transaction managerapplication or module 452. The PBE module 444 takes the password or PINentered by a user into the SE communication module 450 and uses the PINto decrypt the secure channel keys that will then be used to establishthe secure communication channel 448 with the secure channel managermodule 442 of the secure element 390. The secure channel manager module442 of the secure element 390 receives the secure channel keys from thebaseband processor's PBE module 444 in order establish the securecommunication channel 448.

The PBE module 444 functions to help establish secure communicationsbetween the secure element 390 and the baseband CPU 402A so thatunauthorized users and/or programs cannot access the PIN that is used todecrypt cryptographic keys, in which only the cryptographic keys aresent between the CPU 402A and the secure element 390. The PBE module 444may execute or run one or more PBE algorithms known as of this writing.Such PBE algorithms include, but are not limited to, various standards,such as PKCS #5 developed by RSA Laboratories, as understood by one ofordinary skill in the art.

If the secure channel manager module 442 determines that a securecommunication channel has been established correctly, then the securechannel manager module 442 will permit access to the substantialencryption key 446B for decrypting any data that is stored locally onthe PCD 100. Specifically, once the secure channel manager module 442verifies that a secure communication channel has been establishedcorrectly using the PBE algorithm discussed above, then the securechannel manager module 442 may prompt the baseband CPU 402A andspecifically the SE communication application 450, to send over anyencrypted off-line financial data over the secure communication channel448 that may be stored in memory 404A. When any encrypted data isreceived by the substantial encryption key 446B module, it may decryptthe data and transmitted over the secure communication channel 448.

The SE communication module 450 may work with other modules, such as afinancial transaction manager module 452, in order to retrieve anyencrypted off-line data such as financial data for transmission over thesecure communications channel 448. The SE communication module 450 maycomprise a separate application/module or it may be part of variousmodules such as the financial transaction manager module 452, asunderstood by one of ordinary skill in the art.

Once the secure communication channel is established between thebaseband CPU 402A and the secure element 390, the secure channel managermodule 442 may also prompt or request if the SE communication module 450desires to establish a secure communication channel with a server 210.If the SE communication module 450 desires to establish a securecommunication channel with the server 210, then the secure element 390may initiate communications with the server 210 utilizing thesubstantial encryption key 446A for server authentication.

FIG. 5 is a flowchart illustrating a method 500 for managing secureinformation within a PCD 100. Block 505 is the first step in the process500 for managing secure information within the PCD 100. In block 505,the baseband CPU 402A receives a command to start the programapplication or module 444 for communicating with the secure element 390.As noted previously, the SE communication module 450 may be a separateapplication or it may be part of a piece of software or firmware such asthe financial transaction manager application 452 as illustrated in FIG.4.

In block 510, the baseband CPU 402 initializes the SE communicationmodule 450. Next, in block 515, the SE communication module 450 promptsa user to enter a minimized password to access the secure element 390.As noted above, a minimized password is typically a personalidentification number (PIN) with a relatively short amount of characterssuch as on the order of four, five, or six characters which can beeasily remembered by an authorized user of the PCD 100. As explainedabove, a minimized password or PIN may be used because of the securitymeasures 416A, B which may be activated after a low threshold or lownumber of wrong attempts to enter the right password.

In block 518, the minimized password or PIN is passed from the securecommunication application module 450 to the PBE Algorithm application444 which is executed by the baseband CPU 402A as illustrated in FIG. 4.

Next, in routine 520, the secure element communication module 450 usesthe PBE Algorithm module 444 with the minimized password or PIN todecrypt the cryptographic keys stored in the baseband persistentstorage. The secure element communication module 450 will use those keys(typically a set of 3 keys) to establish the secure communicationchannel 448 with the SE 390.

It is important for the PBE algorithm of module 444 to use a non-paddedcipher when encrypting the crypto keys used to establish the securechannel 448, because this does not introduce a pattern to the data.These crypto keys are typically symmetric keys that may comprise onelarge random number. An attacker decrypting the symmetric key would onlybe able to tell if they were successful by trying to establish a securechannel 448 with the SE 390, which would lock them out after three badattempts.

If there was a way for the attacker to tell whether they hadsuccessfully decrypted the symmetric key without talking to the SE 390,then they could launch a brute force offline attack against the key. Thereason the attacker has to talk to the SE 390 is because when theydecrypt the symmetric key the result is just a random number. Usually,an attacker cannot tell one random number from another, so they have tocheck them with the SE 390. However, if a padding cipher is utilized,this introduces a pattern to the data. Only certain PINs (probably onlyone, the actual user PIN) would decrypt the symmetric key in such a wayas to produce the correct padding sequence in the data. So if a paddingcipher is used, it may introduce the ability for the attacker to tellwhether they have successfully decrypted the symmetric key withouthaving to talk to the SE 390. Thus, as described above, a non-paddedcipher is used by the PBE algorithm module 444. Further details ofroutine 520 will be described below in connection with FIG. 6.

After routine 520, in decision block 525, the secure channel managermodule 442 may determine if a secure communication channel 448 has beenestablished between the secure element 390 and the baseband CPU 402A. Ifthe inquiry to decision block 525 is negative, then the “No” branch isfollowed to decision block 540. If the inquiry to decision block 525 ispositive, then the “Yes” branch is followed to block 550.

In decision block 540, the secure channel module 450 determines if apredetermined number of attempts to establish a secure communicationchannel 448 has been exceeded. As described previously, the number ofattempts is generally kept relatively low which increases the level ofsecurity for the secure element 390. For example, a predetermined numberof attempts permitted by the secure channel manager module 442 maycomprise fewer than ten attempts, such as on the order of four, five, orsix attempts to access the secure element 390.

If the inquiry to decision block 540 is negative, then the “No” branchis followed back to block 515 which allows for further attempts atentering the PIN or password. If the inquiry to decision block 540 ispositive meaning that the threshold number of attempts has beenexceeded, then the “YES” branch is followed to block 545 in which thesecurity measures module 416A activates the security measures 416B asillustrated in FIG. 4.

As noted above, if the security measures 416B are activated, thengenerally the secure element 390 is rendered inoperable and in apermanent, and unrepairable state. With the secure element 390 in such aunrepairable state, it would be impossible for any unauthorized user togain access to the encrypted off-line financial data stored in thememory device 404A as illustrated in FIG. 4. Access could not beachieved in this scenario because the substantial encryption key 446Bfor decrypting the encrypted off-line financial data would not beoperable.

In block 550 via decision block 525, the secure channel manager 442 maygrant access to the functions and operations of the secure element 390and the secure element 390 may send a message to the baseband CPU 402Aindicating this access. One of the main functions of the secure element390 may be to decrypt any encrypted off-line financial data stored inthe memory device 404A as illustrated in FIG. 4.

In decision block 555, the secure channel manager 442 may determine ifit has received any locally stored into the data, such as the encryptedoff-line financial data stored in the memory element 404A. If theinquiry to decision block 555 is negative, then the “No” branch isfollowed to decision block 570. If the inquiry to decision block 555 ispositive, then the “Yes” branch is followed to block 560 in which thesubstantial encryption key 446B may be used to decrypt any of thereceived locally stored encrypted data. In block 565, the decrypted datamay be displayed to the user on the display device 108 of FIG. 1B.

In decision block 570, the secure channel manager 442 may determine ifthe baseband CPU 402A desires to communicate with a server 210, such asfor conducting financial transactions utilizing the server 210 incombination with the PCD 100. If the inquiry to decision block 570 isnegative, then the “No” branch is followed and the process ends. If theinquiry to decision block 570 is positive, then the “Yes” branch isfollowed to block 575 in which the secure channel manager 442 utilizesthe substantial encryption key 446A for server authentication in orderto establish a secure communication channel over the communications link103B as illustrated in FIG. 1C. As described previously, the secureelement 390 may utilize substantial encryption keys 446A having sizes onthe order of 1024 Bits or more for asymmetric type encryption keys.

FIG. 6 is a flowchart illustrating a sub-method or a routine 520 of FIG.5 for establishing secure communications between a baseband centralprocessing unit 402A and a secure element 390 of PCD 100. Block 605 isthe first step in the routine 520 for initializing the password basedencryption (PBE) algorithm module 444 of the CPU 402A. Next, in block610, the CPU 402A may execute the instructions within the PBE algorithmmodule 444 utilizing a cipher which is non-padded. In other words, toincrease security for establishing the secure channel 448 between thesecure element 390 and the baseband CPU 402A, a password basedencryption (PBE) encryption algorithm or cipher which does not utilizeany padding is employed. The PBE Algorithm module 444 (in connectionwith the minimized password or PIN) to decrypt cryptographic keys storedin the baseband persistent storage. The secure element communicationmodule 450 will use those keys (typically a set of 3 keys) to establishthe secure channel 448 with the SE 390.

As noted previously, a non-padded cipher is used to encrypt the cryptokeys in order to establish the secure channel 448, because this does notintroduce a pattern to the data. These crypto keys are typicallysymmetric keys that may comprise one large random number.

Next, in block 615, messages utilizing the decrypted crypto keys derivedfrom the non-padded cipher may be exchanged between the secure element390 and the CPU 402A in order to establish the secure channel 448. Theprocess then returns to decision block 525 of FIG. 5.

Certain steps in the processes or process flows described in thisspecification naturally precede others for the invention to function asdescribed. However, the invention is not limited to the order of thesteps described if such order or sequence does not alter thefunctionality of the invention. That is, it is recognized that somesteps may performed before, after, or parallel (substantiallysimultaneously with) other steps without departing from the scope andspirit of the invention. In some instances, certain steps may be omittedor not performed without departing from the invention. Further, wordssuch as “thereafter”, “then”, “next”, etc. are not intended to limit theorder of the steps. These words are simply used to guide the readerthrough the description of the exemplary method.

Additionally, one of ordinary skill in programming is able to writecomputer code or identify appropriate hardware and/or circuits toimplement the disclosed invention without difficulty based on the flowcharts and associated description in this specification, for example.

Therefore, disclosure of a particular set of program code instructionsor detailed hardware devices is not considered necessary for an adequateunderstanding of how to make and use the invention. The inventivefunctionality of the claimed computer implemented processes is explainedin more detail in the above description and in conjunction with theFigures which may illustrate various process flows.

In one or more exemplary aspects, the functions described may beimplemented in hardware, software, firmware, or any combination thereof.If implemented in software, the functions may be stored on ortransmitted as one or more instructions or code on a computer-readablemedium. Computer-readable media include both computer storage media andcommunication media including any medium that facilitates transfer of acomputer program from one place to another. A storage media may be anyavailable media that may be accessed by a computer. By way of example,and not limitation, such computer-readable media may comprise RAM, ROM,EEPROM, CD-ROM or other optical disk storage, magnetic disk storage orother magnetic storage devices, or any other medium that may be used tocarry or store desired program code in the form of instructions or datastructures and that may be accessed by a computer.

Also, any connection is properly termed a computer-readable medium. Forexample, if the software is transmitted from a website, server, or otherremote source using a coaxial cable, fiber optic cable, twisted pair,digital subscriber line (“DSL”), or wireless technologies such asinfrared, radio, and microwave, then the coaxial cable, fiber opticcable, twisted pair, DSL, or wireless technologies such as infrared,radio, and microwave are included in the definition of medium.

Disk and disc, as used herein, includes compact disc (“CD”), laser disc,optical disc, digital versatile disc (“DVD”), floppy disk and blu-raydisc where disks usually reproduce data magnetically, while discsreproduce data optically with lasers. Combinations of the above shouldalso be included within the scope of computer-readable media.

Although selected aspects have been illustrated and described in detail,it will be understood that various substitutions and alterations may bemade therein without departing from the spirit and scope of the presentinvention, as defined by the following claims.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method for managing secure information within aportable computing device by selective establishment of a securecommunication channel within the portable computing device, the methodcomprising: initializing a program module of a central processing unitof the portable computing device for communicating with a secure elementof the portable computing device; receiving a password at the centralprocessing unit of the portable computing device for gaining access tothe secure element of the portable computing device; initializing apassword based encryption algorithm with the password, wherein: if thepassword is correct, initializing the password based encryptionalgorithm with the password generates a correct series of cryptographickeys; and if the password is incorrect, initializing the password basedencryption algorithm with the password generates an incorrect series ofcryptographic keys; exchanging messages between the central processingunit of the portable computing device and the secure element of theportable computing device using the generated series of cryptographickeys to request that a secure communication channel be establishedbetween the secure element of the portable computing device and thecentral processing unit of the portable computing device, wherein: ifthe generated series of cryptographic keys is correct, the securecommunication channel is established; and if the generated series ofcryptographic keys is incorrect, the request to establish the securecommunication channel is denied; if the generated series ofcryptographic keys is incorrect, then determining if a predeterminedthreshold number of requests to establish a secure communication channelhas been achieved; and authenticating the portable computing device to aserver located remotely from the portable computing device with a firstsubstantial encryption key for server authentication, wherein the firstsubstantial encryption key comprises an asymmetric key having a bitlength of greater than or equal to 1024 bits.
 2. The method of claim 1,further comprising activating one or more security measures if thepredetermined threshold number of requests has been achieved.
 3. Themethod of claim 2, wherein the one or more security measures comprisespermanent disablement of the secure element.
 4. The method of claim 1,further comprising granting access to the secure element of the portablecomputing device which comprises at least one of a first substantialencryption key for server authentication with a server located remotelyfrom the portable computing device and a second substantial encryptionkey for decrypting encrypted data stored locally within the portablecomputing device.
 5. The method of claim 1, wherein the password basedencryption algorithm utilizes a non-padded cipher.
 6. The method ofclaim 1, further comprising decrypting encrypted data stored locallywithin the portable computing device with a second substantialencryption key for decrypting data stored locally.
 7. The method ofclaim 6, wherein the first substantial encryption key comprises asymmetric key having a bit length of greater than or equal to 80 bits.8. The method of claim 1, wherein the portable computing devicecomprises at least one of a mobile telephone, a personal digitalassistant, a pager, a smartphone, and a hand-held computer with awireless connection or link.
 9. A computer system for managing secureinformation within a portable computing device via selectiveestablishment of a secure communication channel within the portablecomputing device, the system comprising: a central processing unit ofthe portable computing device operable to: initialize a program moduleof the portable computing device for communicating with a secure elementof the portable computing device; initialize a password based encryptionalgorithm with a received password, wherein: if the password is correct,the password based encryption algorithm generates a correct series ofcryptographic keys; and if the password is incorrect, the password basedencryption algorithm generates an incorrect series of cryptographickeys; exchange messages with the secure element of the portablecomputing device using the generated set of cryptographic keys torequest that a secure communication channel be established between thesecure element of the portable computing device and the centralprocessing unit of the portable computing device, wherein: if thegenerated series of cryptographic keys is correct, the securecommunication channel is established; and if the generated series ofcryptographic keys is incorrect, the request to establish the securecommunication channel is denied; if the generated series ofcryptographic keys is incorrect, then determine if a predeterminedthreshold number of requests to establish a secure communication channelhas been achieved; and authenticate the portable computing device to aserver located remotely from the portable computing device with a firstsubstantial encryption key for server authentication, wherein the firstsubstantial encryption key comprises an asymmetric key having a bitlength of greater than or equal to 1024 bits.
 10. The system of claim 9,wherein the central processing unit of the portable computing device isfurther operable to activate one or more security measures if thepredetermined threshold number requests has been achieved.
 11. Thesystem of claim 10, wherein the one or more security measures comprisespermanent disablement of the secure element.
 12. The system of claim 9,wherein the central processing unit is further operable to grant accessto the secure element of the portable computing device through thesecure communication channel and the secure element of the portablecomputing device comprises at least one of a first substantialencryption key for server authentication with a server located remotelyfrom the portable computing device and a second substantial encryptionkey for decrypting encrypted data stored locally within the portablecomputing device.
 13. The system of claim 9, wherein the password basedencryption algorithm utilizes a non-padded cipher.
 14. The system ofclaim 9, wherein the processor is further operable to: decrypt encrypteddata stored locally within the portable computing device with a secondsubstantial encryption key for decrypting data stored locally.
 15. Thesystem of claim 14, wherein the first substantial encryption keycomprises a symmetric key having a bit length of greater than or equalto 80 bits.
 16. The system of claim 9, wherein the portable computingdevice comprises at least one of a mobile telephone, a personal digitalassistant, a pager, a smartphone, a navigation device, and a hand-heldcomputer with a wireless connection or link.
 17. A computer system formanaging secure information within a portable computing device byselective establishment of a secure communication channel within theportable computing device, the system comprising: means for initializinga program module of a central processing unit of the portable computingdevice for communicating with a secure element of the portable computingdevice; means for receiving a password at the central processing unit ofthe portable computing device for gaining access to the secure elementof the portable computing device; means for initializing a passwordbased encryption algorithm with the password, wherein: if the passwordis correct, initializing the password based encryption algorithm withthe password generates a correct series of cryptographic keys; and ifthe password is incorrect, initializing the password based encryptionalgorithm with the password generates an incorrect series ofcryptographic keys; means for exchanging messages between the centralprocessing unit of the portable computing device and the secure elementof the portable computing device using the generated series ofcryptographic keys to request that a secure communication channel beestablished between the secure element of the portable computing deviceand the central processing unit of the portable computing device,wherein: if the generated series of cryptographic keys is correct, thesecure communication channel is established; and if the generated seriesof cryptographic keys is incorrect, the request to establish the securecommunication channel is denied; and if the generated series ofcryptographic keys is incorrect, means for determining if apredetermined threshold number of requests to establish a secureconnection channel has been achieved; and means for authenticating theportable computing device to a server located remotely from the portablecomputing device with a first substantial encryption key for serverauthentication, wherein the first substantial encryption key comprisesan asymmetric key having a bit length of greater than or equal to 1024bits.
 18. The system of claim 17, further comprising means foractivating one or more security measures if the predetermined thresholdnumber of requests has been achieved.
 19. The system of claim 18,wherein the one or more security measures comprises permanentdisablement of the secure element.
 20. The system of claim 17, furthercomprising means for granting access to the secure element of theportable computing device which comprises at least one of a firstsubstantial encryption key for server authentication with a serverremote from the portable computing device and a second substantialencryption key for decrypting encrypted data stored locally within theportable computing device.
 21. The method of claim 17, wherein thepassword based encryption algorithm has a non-padded cipher.
 22. Thesystem of claim 17, further comprising means for decrypting encrypteddata stored locally within the portable computing device with a secondsubstantial encryption key for decrypting data stored locally.
 23. Thesystem of claim 22, wherein the first substantial encryption keycomprises a symmetric key having a bit length of greater than or equalto 80 bits.
 24. The system of claim 17, wherein the portable computingdevice comprises at least one of a mobile telephone, a personal digitalassistant, a pager, a smartphone, a navigation device, and a hand-heldcomputer with a wireless connection or link.
 25. A computer programproduct comprising a non-transitory computer usable medium having acomputer readable program code embodied therein, said computer readableprogram code adapted to be executed to implement a method for managingsecure information within a portable computing device by selectiveestablishment of a secure communication channel within the portablecomputing device, said method comprising: initializing a program moduleof a central processing unit of the portable computing device forcommunicating with a secure element of the portable computing device;receiving a password, at the central processing unit of the portablecomputing device, for gaining access to the secure element of theportable computing device; initializing a password based encryptionalgorithm with the password, wherein: if the password is correct,initializing the password based encryption algorithm with the passwordgenerates a correct series of cryptographic keys; and if the password isincorrect, initializing the password based encryption algorithm with thepassword generates an incorrect series of cryptographic keys; exchangingmessages between the central processing unit of the portable computingdevice and the secure element of the portable computing device using thegenerated series of cryptographic keys request that a securecommunication channel be established between the secure element of theportable computing device and the central processing unit of theportable computing device, wherein: if the generated series ofcryptographic keys is correct, the secure communication channel isestablished; and if the generated series of cryptographic keys isincorrect, the request to establish the secure communication channel isdenied; if the generated series of cryptographic keys is incorrect, thendetermining if a predetermined threshold number of requests to establisha secure communication channel has been achieved; and authenticating theportable computing device to a server located remotely from the portablecomputing device with a first substantial encryption key for serverauthentication, wherein the first substantial encryption key comprisesan asymmetric key having a bit length of greater than or equal to 1024bits.
 26. The computer program product of claim 25, wherein the programcode implementing the method further comprises activating one or moresecurity measures if the predetermined threshold number requests hasbeen achieved.
 27. The computer program product of claim 26, wherein theone or more security measures comprises permanent disablement of thesecure element.
 28. The computer program product of claim 25, whereinthe program code implementing the method further comprises grantingaccess to the secure element of the portable computing device whichcomprises at least one of a first substantial encryption key for serverauthentication with a server remote from the portable computing deviceand a second substantial encryption key for decrypting encrypted datastored locally within the portable computing device.
 29. The computerprogram product of claim 25, wherein the program code implementing themethod further comprises utilizing a non-padded cipher in the passwordbased encryption algorithm.
 30. The computer program product of claim25, wherein the program code implementing the method further comprisesdecrypting encrypted data stored locally within the portable computingdevice with a second substantial encryption key for decrypting datastored locally.
 31. The computer program product of claim 30, whereinthe wherein the first substantial encryption key comprises a symmetrickey having a bit length of greater than or equal to 80 bits.
 32. Thecomputer program product of claim 25, wherein the portable computingdevice comprises at least one of a mobile telephone, a personal digitalassistant, a pager, a smartphone, a navigation device, and a hand-heldcomputer with a wireless connection or link.